The Rifle Platoon
If the Rifle Squad were the basic building block, the Rifle Platoon represented the first tactically viable subunit of the Infantry Battalion.
It introduced the principle of deploying two to four identical units together and married them with a command structure and integral fire support. This gave its commander the flexibility of being able to operate not only normal fire and manoeuvre elements, but also maintain a small reserve. The fundamentals of how these units operated together at Platoon level can be traced throughout the progression up the Battalion and Regiment.
As with the Rifle Squad, there were three distinct types fielded during World War Two. The most common comprised of three identical Rifle Squads, each with one or two light machine guns.
The next altered the number of Squads, either down to two or up to four, with similar variations on the number of light machine guns.
The final version rearmed any number of the Squads with submachine guns or assault rifles, light machine guns again featuring on occasion.
Make-up of the 'typical' Rifle Platoon
Quite simply there was no such thing. While it is possible to discuss the Rifle Squad in broad terms, the multiple variations and deviations of the Rifle Platoon complicate matters notably. Even a cursory glance at the Example TOE section will illustrate this.
By 1943, the average Infantry Rifle Platoon was comprised of three Rifle Squads, plus a small Headquarters. The British routinely deployed a light mortar and infantry anti-tank weapon. The US Army deployed only the Bazooka, but latterly added extra automatic rifles. The Germans normally issued a reserve light machine gun. The Red Army fielded nothing but a lone officer to command its reduced strength three Squad unit. The picture changes markedly again with the inclusion of armoured infantry and airborne troops, but they will be considered separately.
Likewise, some armies deployed further assets at Company level or higher which could be attached to a Rifle Platoon. It is impossible to capture all these deviations. So this discussion is based primarily upon the Platoon composed of three identical Squads, plus a command element.
Platoon Headquarters
The typical Platoon Headquarters was comprised of the Platoon Commander, his Sergeant, and a number of runners. Additional personnel such as medics, or in the German model wagon drivers were also deployed. The Medic's role was to tend the wounded and dying, and his presence did not impact upon tactics. Wagon drivers and horse leaders remained with their vehicles in the Company Headquarters area to the best of my understanding, and can so be excluded from this examination.
The Platoon Commander and Sergeant
The Platoon Commander was a junior officer, or NCO officer candidate in the German Army. He occupied a vital and somewhat unenviable position in the chain of command. His duty was to achieve the objective assigned to his Platoon at the minimal cost in casualties. The definition of minimal cost would vary dependent upon the mission in hand, and the importance of the objective. If the value were thought high enough by superior commanders, it could equal the greater portion of the Platoon's strength.
The Lieutenant was uniquely positioned to share the frustrations of his men at the sometimes absurd orders they received from above, but was duty bound to carry them out to the best of his ability. He was also best placed to see the often tragic consequences. There was also the question of whether he was the Platoon's Leader, or its Commander. That may sound like the same thing, but there is a subtle difference.
Some officers took it upon themselves to lead from the front, setting an example by doing the job themselves. While highly commendable they often paid the ultimate price for their bravery. Armies needed to promote experienced Platoon Commanders to the next level, but they had to live long enough to gain that experience. With three Squad Leaders and between 30 and 40 men, Lieutenants needed to learn the art of delegation and directing the efforts of their men, without necessarily becoming embroiled in the fire fight themselves. Yet when the unit faltered or found itself pinned down, it was the Platoon Commander's responsibility to rise up and urge his men onward with the cry of follow me or come on lads! That was when the Commander became a Leader.
The Platoon Sergeant acted as the second in command of the unit. Given the eccentricities of how men received commissions in the various armies of the day, his presence was no accident. A new Lieutenant or Subaltern could find himself in command with little or no combat or management experience. The Platoon Sergeant was by comparison a veteran. He had worked his way up from rifleman to Squad Leader and was fully versed in the handling of the Platoon.
The intelligent officer would learn to rely on the advice and counsel of his Sergeant while he familiarised himself with his new command. Psychologically, there was no doubt ample scope for friction, but it was not the Sergeant's job to weaken the authority of his Lieutenant anymore than to allow him to commit tactical errors without offering comment. Practically speaking, the Sergeant took command of the Platoon in the absence or loss of the Lieutenant. Similarly, should the Sergeant fall one of the Squad Leaders would replace him, and his post would be taken by his assistant.
Interestingly, both the German and Russian armies deleted the Platoon Sergeant during their 1943 reorganisations, meaning their Platoon Commanders shouldered an even greater responsibility.
Most officers were issued a pistol of some sort, or privately acquired one. This was often supplemented by a submachine gun or carbine. Sergeants more traditionally carried rifles, but also began to adopt these light automatic weapons.
Runners and signallers
Given the immense technological advances of the post-war era, it is easy to forget that communications during World War Two were somewhat basic.
Each Platoon included a number of messengers or runners, at least two and sometimes three. These men were tasked with carrying the verbal orders of the Platoon Commander to any Squads out of direct control, or to neighbouring units. They also provided a link back to Company Headquarters.
While armed with a rifle the runner's role was not primarily a combat one. Rather his task was to deliver his message accurately to the intended recipient and return to his commander with the reply or situation report. This had to be done in the midst of battle when units could quickly and unexpectedly shift location, and of course in the face of enemy fire.
The receiver transmitter radio became an increasingly important part of Platoon communications in Western armies as the war progressed. Radios though remained notoriously unreliable, and transmissions could fail due to terrain obstacles or atmospherics. These faults ensured the runner never disappeared from the battlefield, but radios provided the most effective means of communication with the more distant Company or Battalion Headquarters.
Signaller were not officially identified in British or American Rifle Platoons. Instead, one of the runners, usually the officer's Batman for the British, would act as such. German signallers were attached from Company Headquarters. Battalion Signals Platoons could also assign men to the role. The exception here is the Red Army, who were lucky to issue one radio per Battalion, yet alone Platoon, leaving them totally reliant upon runners. When dedicated messengers were deleted in the reduced strength units, men had to be taken from the Rifle Squads to perform the role.
Fire Support
At the start of the war the light 51 mm type mortar was a popular support weapon, versions equipping British, German and Russian Platoons. By 1942/43 only the British retained their 2 inch model in the role. Such weapons were intended to deliver explosive rounds, but these proved of minimal tactical benefit, and the British increasingly used theirs to provide a smokescreen.
Anti-tank weapons, either rifles or projectors, were a more important consideration. Both the British and Americans issued them directly to the Platoon, requiring a couple of men to be detached as the crew (Wargamers insist these were the Platoon runners, but I would argue otherwise). The Germans and Russians by comparison maintained separate units, which could be found anywhere from Company to Regimental level. Whichever system was used though, the general rule of thumb was at least one anti-tank weapon per Platoon.
Anti-tank tactics are worthy of discussion in their own right, so will not be included here. The Platoon Commander though would wish to keep his anti-tank weapons close to hand during the offensive phase, ready to respond to the appearance of enemy armour. Aggressive tank hunting exercises were a very different proposition.
The Platoon in the Offence
It is with the Platoon that the principle of formation and its use in tactics begins to emerge.
There is a limit to the number of men a commander can exercise personal control over, roughly speaking around ten (as demonstrated on the sports field). That helped determine the realistic size of the Squad. The Infantry Platoon could vary between as few as thirty or as many as fifty men dependent upon type and circumstance. The Platoon Commander could not hope to exercise effective personal control over such a body. What he could do was direct his men through their Squad Leaders, and deploy any support weapons as he saw fit.
With a three Squad Platoon, there were three distinct offensive formations which could be adopted. They were known by many names, but perhaps the most descriptive would be arrowhead, V shape, and line.
Arrowhead
The arrowhead or narrow wedge formation had the advantage that it kept the bulk of the Platoon from direct contact with the enemy during the initial stage.
It was characterised by a lead or scout Squad taking the advance. The remaining two Squads would move in parallel some distance behind the first, forming a triangular shape. The Platoon Headquarters group would occupy the centre of the formation, allowing the commander to exercise direct control over all three of his subunits.
Quite how the Platoon deployed could vary. The British for example applied the same 'one leg on the ground' principle described in the Rifle Squad. On encountering resistance, the lead Squad would shift to a fire role, pinning the enemy. The Platoon Commander would then seek to move his remaining Squads into a position from where they could launch their assault, bypassing the more heavily defended frontal approach in favour of attacking a weaker flank.
The British interpretation of the Platoon Assault. Note the detachment of a Bren Gun team to cover the enemy line of retreat and reinforcement. The smoke screen was generated by the 2 inch mortar
The arrowhead could also be developed in a less deliberate manner. Once the lead Squad took fire they would again return it. The Platoon Commander would then seek to advance his other Squads by bounds, using the covering fire of the first initially. As the manoeuvre Squads reached their next cover they would then take over the fire role and allow the remaining Squad or Squads to move up.
In either tactic the Platoon Commander was required to exercise a substantial degree of control. The drawback with the British interpretation came when the movement element was taken under effective fire. The Commander had to decide how best to neutralise it to allow him to achieve his original objective. This could involve detaching a Bren Gun team or using the 2 inch mortar to provide smoke cover. The danger was he could deplete his two Squads to such a degree in tackling the immediate threat he would be unable to assault the primary one.
In the more fluid version described in the German and Russian manuals, the emphasis was on the Commander directing the actions of his Squads. By advancing in bounds the moving squads were dependent on the stationary ones for their covering fire. It necessitated the Commander designate accurately which Squads would make the bounds and to where, and which Squads would provide suppressive fire and against what.
V shape
The V shape or broad wedge was a popular and simple tactic.
It mimicked the arrowhead but inverted the deployment of the Squads. Now, the advance was carried by two Squads moving in parallel. The third Squad was held back in support, while Platoon Headquarters again occupied the centre.
This reversal placed the greater part of the Platoon in direct line with the enemy, however it also increased the immediate weight of fire the Commander could bring to bear against them. The leading Squads would cover each other using the founding principles of fire and movement. The third Squad was held back in reserve, or used to provide additional over watching fire.
The 'two up, one back' theory was practiced by the American forces all the way from Platoon to Divisional level. It provided a simple, repeatable formula to progress the advance that constantly shifted the focus from left to right and back again. Perhaps the drawback was that the only way to achieve numerical superiority in the close assault was to throw in the third Squad, or better still use it to cover the final assault of the other two.
Line
The line formation is, somewhat unsurprisingly, referred to notably in the Red Army regulations. Each Squad of the Platoon formed itself into skirmish line, and then each Squad moved into line with the 'Guide' or Scout Squad. Movement could be conducted either under supporting fire from a selected Squad or Squads, or the whole Platoon would advance as one, firing from the hip with rifles, machine pistols and light machine guns.
The instruction that the line should only be formed if the Platoon was caught by surprise seems somewhat vague. The manual demonstrates it specifically for the four Squad Platoon, which had largely vanished by 1943. However, it was no doubt practiced by the reduced strength three Squad Platoon after this point.
Post Assault
Consolidation has been touched upon in the Rifle Squad. Likewise, the tasks of assessing losses and ammunition supply, tending wounded and guarding any prisoners discussed there also apply to the Platoon.
The Platoon Commander would need to regroup his unit, which would naturally have become spread out during the offensive phase, to repel any counterattack. His Squad Leaders would need to report their status regarding casualties and ammunition. Losses among Squad Leaders would also need to be addressed.
Likewise, the Platoon Commander would need to communicate his status up to his Company Commander, either by runner or radio. He had to prepare the men to move off for a further assault, or improve their defensive positions for a longer stay, dependent upon the Company plan.
The Platoon in the Defence
The duties of the Platoon in the defence were the same as the Rifle Squad, maintain their position.
However, a Platoon unlike a Squad, had the resources to occupy a much larger area and to defend in depth. The peculiarities of the terrain involved would always dictate the exact placement of the Squads. Generally speaking, a Platoon Commander would not want to commit more than two of his Squads to the main line, placing his third to provide cover fire or deal with any breach of the position.
He would need to site his weapons and rifle pits to provide an unbroken field of fire over the approach to his position. In particularly exposed positions, he may detach a small group to man an outpost.
Outpost is one of the least appealing duties the soldier can be landed with. It is more constructively discussed in later segments, but it could also play a part in the Platoon defence. In essence, the Platoon could occupy a position where it was possible for the enemy to advance quite close to their main line undetected. If they were allowed to do so unchallenged the whole unit could be overrun. To guard against this, the Commander could choose to deploy a small detachment some distance forward of his main line. Their role was to act as a 'tripwire' which could detect the enemy before they closed to contact. Such a position was particularly unenviable but vital to secure the integrity of the defence. A more detailed examination of the outpost and its variants is best left for the other segments.
It is also with the Platoon that the use of obstacles can be introduced. Commanders could normally expect to receive an allotment of landmines and or barbed wire to fortify their location in a prepared defence. In a hasty one they would have to make do with digging in and scrounging whatever was available locally if they had time to.
Barbed wire and mines could not stop a determined assault alone. To be truly effective, they needed to be covered with fire. The delays caused to an assault force by their presence would be irrelevant unless they could be engaged while hung up on the wire or probing their way through a minefield.
Movement by Formations
The formations examined above were the main variations used during combat. On the advance to combat, the Platoon would normally form a column, with one Squad in the lead followed by the Platoon Headquarters and any support weapons, then the remaining Squads behind. The lead Squad would normally throw out several Scouts unless the Platoon was travelling in a secure area.
The Platoon Commander could be accompanied by the leaders of his latter two Squads during the march. In the event that the Platoon did encounter opposition, he could then quickly issue them their orders without having to rely on runners.
Diagrammatic view of the arrowhead type formation. The 'O' Group was the orders group and in this instance was composed of the commander, signaller, runner and relevant Section commanders
There is a temptation to believe that commanders would religiously adhere to the formations laid down in their particular drills. The reality was that movement normally had to conform to the nature of the terrain and the need to maintain cover. Platoons could move from column to deployment and back again as deemed necessary to effect the safest passage. The important factor was to keep control of the Squads and not allow the Platoon to drift apart. Distance needed to be kept between the Squads and HQ though to prevent a single hit causing disproportionate casualties.
Alternatives to the typical Rifle Platoon
As mentioned during the introduction, there were numerous variations on the Platoon formation. However, the two most important are summarised below.
Two or Four Squads
At the outset of the war, both the German and Russian armies used a four Squad Platoon, supported by a light mortar detachment and a Headquarters. By 1943 most of their units fielded just three Squads and an HQ. However, for a time at least, both based their tactics upon a square Platoon rather than a triangular one.
The most obvious impact was on formation. The presence of a fourth Squad had to be accommodated. The manuals suggest the fourth Squad simply fell into the rear of the arrowhead or V shape formation, providing a reserve element. The Russian also makes mention of the Platoon advancing by Squads or 'Sections'. That would suggest the combination of two Squads, perhaps under the Platoon Commander and Sergeant respectively. Oblique reference is also made to the German Platoon deploying as two halves, led by the Commander and Sergeant respectively.
During late 1942 the Red Army issued an additional pair of light machine guns to their Rifle Platoons. Two Squads in each were reinforced with a second weapon to supplement their first. The effect of this on the Platoon is not covered in the manual. It would seem reasonable to speculate however that the Platoon could have deployed itself as two Sections, each of two Squads. Within the Section one Squad could now generate a far more substantial amount of suppressive fire to allow the other to manoeuvre into position. The two Sections could then operate in a typical fire and movement combination.
Platoons could also fall to two Squads either by circumstance or design. British Commando and US Ranger units deleted their third Squads, while early US Parachute Platoons would also seem to have done so. Red Army Platoons often fielded only two Squads by 1944 as the horrendous casualties of the Infantry began to bite. In the Western model, each Platoon was provided with a third Weapons or Support Squad, manning a light mortar. This enabled the two Rifle Squads to operate under their support fire, otherwise advancing in the normal two up manner described above. In the Red Army model the loss of the third Squad was not compensated for, and the two units had to rely on each other for mutual support.
Submachine Gun or Sturm Platoons
These two types of Squads have already been discussed in the Rifle Squad segment. Their parent Platoons remained unique to the Russian and German armies.
The Red Army Submachine gun Platoon simply fielded three Squads under a single Lieutenant. As with the Squad they were reliant upon heavy weapons to cover their advance, and once in the close assault could act as any other three Squad unit.
The German Sturm Platoon could use either the machine pistol or assault rifle. In either case, the first two Squads would be entirely armed with the appropriate automatic weapon. The third Squad would then deploy a more conventional mixture of rifles and light machine guns to offer support. While not specifically detailed, the format would suggest the third Squad provided the base of fire by which the other two would manoeuvre to launch the close assault.
Additional light machine guns were also intended for issue either to the assault Squads, or they could equally be used to increase the base of fire. Its appearance during the last period of the war means there is relatively little mention made of its intended use. The appearance of the assault rifle after the war also meant it was not a tactic that was widely copied.
Summary
Of all the formations used during World War Two, the Rifle Platoon is the most amorphous. It had the assets to enable it to operate in a more isolated manner than the Squad, but was best used in conjunction with the supporting elements found in its parent unit, the Rifle Company.
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Infantry Tactics of World War Two