Infantry Antitank tactics
The appearance of the tank on the battlefield left the infantry with an unenviable problem to solve; how do you defeat a machine which is immune to the majority of our current weapons?
Even tanks with minimal armour plating could withstand smallarms fire, so at a stroke rifles, machine guns, ordinary hand grenades and even mortar rounds were rendered impotent. These weapons represented the arsenal of any typical Infantry Battalion at the outset of war in 1939. The first generation of dedicated anti-tank weapons proved marginal at best, and were supplemented by various close assault munitions, until the arrival of the much improved second wave of weapons during 1943.
The deployment of towed anti-tank guns has already been covered in the Weapons Company segment. This section will focus on those weapons found at Company level. They can essentially be divided into two distinct categories, namely close assault and ranged weapons.
Close assault
Close assault tactics represented the most desperate counter measures the infantry could use against tank attack. The weapons at their disposal varied considerably. Hand grenades, both normal fragmentation types and dedicated anti-tank designs provided the bulk of the firepower. These were supplemented by concoctions such as the Molotov Cocktail, or fire bottle in Red Army parlance, nothing more than a glass filled with gasoline and lit from a soaked rag.
That during a 'modern' conflict such as World War Two, individual riflemen were expected and required to make personal attacks against enemy tanks still amazes me. However, such remained the case for a large portion of the war. The ideal assault would, of course, be made by a small group of men rather than a single soldier, though such bravery was common. The German Army in particular issued copious instructions to their infantry on how to assail primarily Russian machines, and even instituted a special combat decoration as a reward.
Troops sought to gain every advantage over the enemy tanks crews. Primary among these was to deprive the crew of vision. During the assault, tank crews would always fight 'buttoned up', that is with their hatches closed. This meant the only way they could see out was through the vision ports or slits. This naturally restricted their field of view. The close assault aimed to restrict it even further.
Smoke has always been a two-edged sword to the soldier. Any attempt to blind the enemy runs the risk of backfiring with a simple change of wind direction. In the close assault though, smoke was an indispensable tool. Smoke grenades or generators (pots filled with chemical compounds), or any available materials including vegetation, were all used. Such preparations could only be made in the infantryman's own position, where they knew the terrain and had constructed pits and slit trenches. Tanks risked losing their formation as they ventured into such areas, each seeking a suitable route to exploit the breakthrough. To suddenly find themselves engulfed in thick, often choking smoke must have caused considerable discomfort.
But smoke alone would not destroy the target. That required the application of explosives. In the years before ranged weapons became available, the only way to deliver such items was either by throwing them, or jumping onto the tank itself.
A huge variety of explosive charges were devised for this task. The intriguing thing is they were not all designed to simply punch a hole through the hull armour. A number of vulnerable points were identified on machines, notably the vision ports, engine deck plate and the tracks. These areas were not actually armour plated, and as a result more susceptible. The Germans also deployed blocks of explosive which could be hung over the barrel of the main gun, mangling it on detonation. The preferred method was to avoid actually having to mount the tank. When called to do so, the image of a group of soldiers attempting to lever open the sealed hatches with crowbars, firing into vision slits with pistols or submachine guns, or thrashing away at view ports with iron bars looks distinctly prehistoric. The two main obstacles to such an attack were presented by the machine guns on the tank and any accompanying infantry. Every effort was made to separate tanks and their own infantry. The defenders could fight a traditional gun battle against the foot soldiers to pin them down. The tank machine guns were a different proposition.
Most tanks mounted machine guns co-axial to the main armament and in the bow, for use against fleeing enemy infantry or anti-tank guns crews. Just because a tank crew was blinded by smoke did not mean they would not fire. The assault party had to avoid these guns by approaching from the rear, which left them exposed to attack by any following machine. The hope was the smokescreen would be sufficient to degrade cooperation and mutual support between the tanks, forcing each to fight on its own and be defeated in detail. It should be noted, there was nothing to prevent one tank from machine-gunning the hull of another to clear it of enemy infantry, knowing the crew would be immune so long as they remained sealed inside.
One sure way of evicting the crew was through the use of fire. Fire was, and remains, the nightmare of any man fighting inside a tank, filled with ammunition and fuel. If hand grenades could not be forced through the slits, petrol soaked rags could. The engine decking could be doused with gasoline and lit from afar by a flame bottle.
Leaping onto moving tanks in an attempt to push fragmentation grenades inside, or lay charges against them seems a practically suicidal measure. However, the threat was deemed sufficient for the Germans to develop Zimmerit coating. This was applied to Panzers to prevent magnetic charges being fixed to the hull, which proved quite effective. What the infantry wanted though was some way to put physical distance between himself and the target, rather than having to walk right up to it.
Ranged weapons
Ranged weapons were a far more preferable means of engaging tanks, however the distances involved were only slightly improved for the infantry arm. The most readily available was the mine. The principle use of the mine was to be buried just below the surface of the ground, disabling the tank by blowing a track off as it exploded on contact. It could also be used in a less static manner. A group of mines could be laced together and pulled into the path of an oncoming tank, (rather like the 'stinger' beloved of police forces for stopping stolen cars). A driver could perhaps avoid one mine, but not a string of them. The advantage was that the infantry could deploy these without breaking cover, simply pulling them on rope.
The more conventional idea of a ranged weapon was provided by a host of other devices. Anti-tank rifles quickly proved incapable of penetrating thickening armour, but could do vision ports. Rifle launched grenades offered some stand off capability, but were likewise limited against armour plate. Tank tracks offered a more tempting target. All of these weapons shared a similar trait, in that they could damage a tank, but not destroy it. For a considerable period, these weapons were used in conjunction with the close attack tactics described above. Enemy machines could be disabled and blinded by a combination of smoke, mines and armour piercing bullets battering them like hailstones. Close assault parties, who had lain in wait for the tanks to pass over them, could then spring up onto the machines with their collection of explosives, flammable liquids and handguns. Their own machine gunners and riflemen were needed to counter the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks while they went about their astounding task.
It was not until the arrival of the US launcher, rocket, antitank, or Bazooka, that the infantry made up some ground. The Bazooka allowed a two-man team to target an enemy tank from perhaps a hundred metres, initially with a reasonable chance of success. Unlike previous efforts, the warhead could actually penetrate the armour hull and cause damage inside the tank, without having to climb onboard and attach the charge personally. The British PIAT followed suit, until both weapons were aced by the German Panzerschreck. The irony was that, just as Allied troops in the West gained these new weapons, the Germans were fielding even heavier tanks which proved far harder to destroy. In the East, the Red Army eschewed the use of anything other than anti-tank rifles and close assault parties for the entire war, for reasons never entirely explained.
The British 'ideal' of a tank ambush. Each machine is cut off by use of smoke and mines to prevent or disrupt mutual support. Note the Platoon has command of its own motor transport to haul the weight of equipment needed. Also note the artist kindly omitted any accompanying Panzer Grenadiers from the sketch...
The tactical deployment of such weapons was generally similar to the towed anti-tank guns described elsewhere. In the defence, they would be sited to cover likely avenues of approach. Their small size allowed troops to remain silent until the target passed them by, offering a more profitable flanking shot in the ideal scenario. At close range though, even the mighty Panther could be halted. The increasing number of more lightly armoured assault guns being pressed into service in lieu of real Panzers were more vulnerable, being based on older tank designs. In the offence, Allied soldiers could only really use their weapons to react to the appearance of enemy armour. Instructions were issued for tank hunting parties. The British called for a Rifle Platoon to be equipped with two PIATs, plus smoke and Hawkins anti-tank grenades. Enemy tanks were to be ambushed and separated from one another by liberal use of smoke. The first machine would be halted by a necklace of mines, the second and third by flanking shots from PIATs. Ironically, it was the German Army which made the best use of tank stalking in the Normandy campaign. Their 8.8 cm projector proved dreadfully effective against Allied Shermans and Cromwells. The nature of the countryside allowed their by now experienced close assault parties to move within short range before opening fire. The massive increase in the issue of the lighter but still lethal Panzerfaust series only increased the potential.
Summary
The infantryman of World War Two was singularly ill-equipped to deal with the threat of tanks without the support of towed guns. The numerous drills promulgated by the High Commands largely ignored the realities of infantry tank assault. It was a particularly risky element of an already sufficiently dangerous occupation. Close assault was largely learnt on the job, as troops used whatever was to hand to halt the enemy, or died trying. Tanks were meant to be targeted by long range guns, not by point blank methods.
It is by no means surprising that in the post-war years, the infantryman has seen a quantum leap in his ability to engage and destroy modern tanks from enormous distances. There is an argument that his lethality has advanced to such a point, the tank may well be displaced from the battlefield in the foreseeable future. If so, the seeds of its destruction were sown on the battlefields of Russia and France, in the bitter struggles of World War Two, where man versus machine was played out in deadly fashion.
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Infantry Tactics of World War Two