Reduced Strength Rifle Battalions
It is normal practice to attempt to retain veteran units in combat. The theory is that they are more valuable, even under strength, than a full strength outfit which has no experience of battle. British, German and American units would therefore normally receive drafts of replacements to make good at least a portion of their losses. The Red Army, however, developed a notably different philosophy.
They recognised the need to feed new recruits into existing formations, but they were simply unable to meet demands caused by their astronomical casualty lists. Instead, they simply authorised a series of modified organisational tables. They were triggered when overall Regimental strength fell to a certain level, and regrouped the remaining assets into a tighter formation. As these ceilings became evermore lower, the effects on the Battalion were truly astonishing. Further reductions were borne by Regimental troops, but as this site is devoted to the Battalion in all its forms, they will not be discussed here.
The changes of 1943
The Rifle Battalion as discussed on the previous page was intended to be the final step in the evolutionary process. However in 1943 a series of new challenges and problems arose which required further amendments. It's difficult to be precise about the timing and the order of these changes, so they are covered here in the most logical fashion.
Political Officers - it appears that during 1943 the Communist leadership reviewed the necessity of maintaining a Commissar in every Company level formation. They concluded this was a luxury they could no longer afford, and the Officers were removed, those at Battalion and above presumably remaining in post. In typical Communist fashion though, those involved were retrained - as Rifle Platoon commanders! They must have received such a welcome from their comrades in the Infantry when they returned...
Reduced strength Battalion - in the latter half of 1943, it was becoming apparent that it was a struggle to maintain Battalions at even the slim 600 man strength previously envisioned. A new table of organisation was approved for those units which could no longer meet the late 1942 version.
Firepower was significantly reduced, with both the Mortar Company and the Machine Gun Company losing their third Platoon, leaving each with six of their respective weapons.
In each Rifle Company, the 50 mm Mortar was permanently banished, it was simple unable to create the degree of carnage the Red Army was now seeking to inflict. The Company Machine Gun Squad was retained however. The Rifle Platoon was reorganised yet again. This time, it lost its fourth Squad. Platoon HQ was now simply a lone Officer, no Sergeant or runner to aid him. The three Squads were each now eleven men strong, a leader and ten men with just one LMG per Squad. The allocation of sub machine guns is unclear, but perhaps the Squad was reminiscent of that used back in early 1941, with a couple of men carrying the PPsh 41, a two man gun team, six riflemen and a leader. Perhaps even a sniper rifle was to be found in the rifle element?
No exact figure is given, but roughly speaking the Battalion would have dropped to around five hundred all ranks.
Sub machine gun units - during 1942, Rifle Regiments were authorised an independent Company of some 100 men armed entirely with the PPsh 41 sub machine gun. They were used as shock troops, particularly valuable in the street fighting role.
In 1943, the issue of SMGs was increased beyond any previous measure. There are several differing accounts of how this was enacted within the Battalions, so these are just a couple of opinions. In each Rifle Company, one Platoon was re-equipped entirely with the SMG. Quite how this affected the Platoon structure is unclear. The SMG Company proper used a ten man Squad, with three Squads serving under a single Officer. There is also room for interpretation on whether the Platoons in the Rifle Companies kept their DP light machine guns for support, as they were not present in the SMG Company at Regiment. Another version suggests only one Squad per platoon was re-armed, and realistically by this time most Platoons would have been operating at most three Squads. It was one area where some authority was delegated to commanders to act as they saw fit for their local conditions.
It's interesting to compare this with the Volks Grenadier units described in the German Army section. It's clear where the German inspiration came from. To describe the training and equipment of the average Russian soldier as rudimentary is an understatement. The new tactic was overwhelming firepower, but deployed at extremely close ranges, matched by extremely high casualties as a result.
Staged reductions - during late 1943 and into 1944, the Red Army took the offensive from the Nazis. The issue of sub machine guns mentioned above was an indication of their new aggressive spirit. But the losses did not abate. Even a five hundred man Battalion was becoming unrealistic in many areas.
Several versions exist of how further reductions were enacted, this is just one of them. They were targeted primarily at Regimental level.
Firstly, each Rifle Company lost a full Platoon, no indication of whether it was rifle or SMG armed. This alone would reduce the Battalion to around four hundred men, practically half of its allied counterpart. Secondly, the third Platoon was reinstated, but the Regiment lost its entire third Battalion. Finally, these two Battalions each lost their third Rifle Company, each of which lost their third Platoon. If the support weapons were retained at similar levels, the Battalion would be perhaps 250 to 300 hundred strong all ranks. That was half the level of the Battalion of two years previous.
Summary
During just under four years of conflict, the Red Army moved from the brink of annihilation to the capture of Berlin. That the Infantry was able to accomplish this bereft of effective anti tank weapons and only a limited supply of modern firearms is truly miraculous. But the human cost was immense. German accounts are somewhat coloured, speaking of human wave assaults delivered with no tactical acumen. I've heard similar remarks from British and American troops on German operations oddly enough. The Red Army did grow in its skills throughout the war, those men who survived becoming extremely capable fighters. Preparations improved, huge batteries being assembled to pound German positions and swarms of Shturmovik ground assault fighters being deployed. Yet underpinning all this was an acceptance of massive casualties. In the final analysis, the soldier was treated simply as an expendable munition. Tales abound of men sent unarmed against the Germans, told to pick up the weapons of their fallen comrades who had preceded them. It's sickening to comprehend. Anyone who turned back would be shot down by his own side as a coward. In such a nightmare existence it's a true wonder anyone survived. That they ultimately prevailed is adequate testament to their bravery.
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Russian Divisional Organisations